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Abstract:  
 
The case-law of the European Court of Justice is full of standard formulas. This article 
analyses one such formula, the so-called ‘formula on retained powers’ according to 
which the scope of application of EU law extends to subject areas over which Member 
States are supposed to have retained powers. It attempts to trace it back through the 
line of ECJ decisions, to analyse the specific components and arguments encapsulated 
in it, and to identify its justifications and effects. It is argued that the recurrence of this 
judicial formula amounts to the emergence of a new doctrine in EU law called the ‘total 
law doctrine’ based on both the recognition of the essential own capacities of the 
Member States within the integrated European space and on the requirement to 
include certain under-protected interests and situations in the manner national 
authorities usually use to think and to act. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is almost an adage. The expression has become commonplace in EU law. 
When confronted with a controversial issue of applicability, the Court usually 
refers to a single formula – or to a slight alteration of it –, set out thus:  
 
Whilst it is not in dispute that EU law does not detract from the powers of the 
Member States [recognized in particular in the areas of direct taxation, social 
protection, education, attribution of nationality, civil status of persons], the fact 
remains that, when exercising those powers, the Member States must comply 
with EU law.1  
 
Such State powers are occasionally labelled ‘retained powers’ by the Court or, 
less frequently, ‘areas of reserved competence’.2 For this reason, I call this 
expression the ‘formula on retained powers’. Notice, however, that in the 
French language, the working language of the Court, the formula is asserted in 
terms of ‘compétence/competence’ rather than in terms of ‘pouvoirs/powers’.3 
 
Literally this formula means that the scope of application of EU law extends 
beyond the subject areas over which the EU has been given jurisdiction. By 
dissociating the existence of state powers from the exercise of such powers, the 
Court legitimizes the application of EU law in any domain that is not a priori 
within the Union’s scope of intervention.4 Should any sector not feature on the 
list of exclusive or shared powers attributed to the Union under the Treaty, it 
does not follow that the application of EU law shall be excluded from that 
sector.5 As a result, the applicability of EU law particularly of specific provisions 
                                            
1 See e.g. Case C-73/08, Bressol [2010] § 28. And see the list of cases mentioned in notes 49 and 
50. 
2 See e.g. Case C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] § 21 and Case C-281/06, Jundt [2007] § 85. 
3 In the Schumacker case, the central passage reads:  ‘Il convient de constater que si, en l'état actuel 
du droit communautaire, la matière des impôts directs ne relève pas en tant que telle du domaine de la 
compétence de la Communauté, il n'en reste pas moins que les États membres doivent exercer leurs 
compétences retenues dans le respect du droit communautaire’. In the Bressol case, it reads ‘il convient 
de rappeler que si le droit de l’Union ne porte pas atteinte à la compétence des États membres en ce qui 
concerne l’organisation de leurs systèmes éducatifs et de la formation professionnelle – en vertu des 
articles 165, paragraphe 1, et 166, paragraphe 1, TFUE –, il demeure toutefois que, dans l’exercice de 
cette compétence, ces États doivent respecter le droit de l’Union et, notamment, les dispositions relatives à 
la liberté de circuler et de séjourner sur le territoire des États membres’. 
4 Except perhaps in relation to Article 346 TFEU (essential interests of state security). In 
relation to Art. 345 (the system of property ownership), see Case C-302/97, Konle [1999] § 38. 
5 The list of exclusive and shared competences conferred upon the Union is in articles 3 and 4 
TFEU. 
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enshrined in primary law (freedoms of movement and general principles of EU 
law) appears to be indifferent to the constitutional attribution of powers.6 The 
scope of EU law may reach far beyond the limits of the legislative powers 
bestowed on EU institutions. It is a phenomenon that K. Lenaerts has 
identified and coined ‘the framing of national laws by EU law’.7 As a translation 
from the French expression ‘encadrement des droits nationaux’, it is used in the 
combined senses of ‘limiting’, ‘containing’, ‘ring-fencing’.8  
 
The surprising thing is that while the effects of such case-law upset some 
specialists of the branches of national law that are so affected (especially tax 
law, private international law and social protection law specialists), its source is 
rarely examined. It may be that the formula says nothing that the generalists of 
EU law do not already know: EU law, in some of its provisions, has a practically 
unlimited field of application. This is the result of a well-established case law 
particularly in the area of the freedom of movement. Provisions on freedom of 
movement are ‘non-specific’ in scope9 and it is settled case-law that the strict 
possibility to derogate from them does not amount ‘to reserve certain matters to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States’.10 The Court has rejected the idea 
that State derogations enshrine ‘reservations of sovereignty’. In addition, it is 
established precedent that the exercise of the Member States ‘exclusive’ 
competence in the area of criminal law is subject to the ‘limits’ laid down by 
Community law.11 Accordingly, it has been long and rightly stated that ‘There 
simply is no nucleus of sovereignty that the Member States can invoke, as such, against 
the Community’.12  
 
                                            
6 See S. Weatherill, ‘Competence and Legitimacy’ in C. Barnard & O. Odudu (eds), The Outer 
Limits of European Union Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009). 
7 K. Lenaerts, ‘Federalism and the Rule of Law: Perspectives from the European Court of 
Justice’ (2010) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1338. 
8 See K. Lenaerts, ‘L’encadrement par le droit de l’Union européenne des compétences des 
Etats membres’ in Mélanges en l’honneur du Professeur Jean Paul Jacqué (Paris, Dalloz, 2010). 
9 See, the opinion of A.G. Kokott in Tas-Hagen and Tas (Case C-192/05 [2006]), § 34. See also K. 
Lenaerts, ‘Les répercussions des compétences de la Communauté européenne sur les 
compétences externes des Etats membres et la question de la préemption’, in P. Demaret (ed), 
Relations extérieures de la Communauté européenne et marché intérieur: aspects juridiques et 
fonctionnels (Story Scientia, Brussels, 1987). 
10 See e.g. Case 72/83 Campus Oil [1984] § 32. 
11 Case 203/80, Casati [1981] § 22; Case C-387/93, Banchero [1995] § 58. For discussion, see V. 
Michel, Recherches sur les compétences de la Communauté (L’Harmattan, Paris, 2003). 
12 K. Lenaerts, ‘Constitutionalism and the many faces of federalism’ (1990) 38 American Journal 
of Comparative Law 205, 220. 
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In view of this, one may wonder whether the retained powers formula, 
incorporated in the Court’s case law in the mid 1990s, is not essentially 
rhetorical in its scope. But let us not conclude too hastily. For, if not its 
content, the context in which the formula is currently expressed is new. The 
overabundance of provisions limiting the Union’s competences in the treaties is 
one of the most obvious marks left by the Lisbon Treaty. The new Treaties 
assert that ‘the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences 
conferred upon it by the Member States’,13 that ‘competences not conferred upon 
the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States’,14 that proposals for 
the amendment of the Treaties ‘may serve either to increase or to reduce the 
competences conferred on the Union’,15 or that ‘[t]he Charter does not extend the field 
of application of Union law beyond the power of the Union’16. All of this come down to 
putting out one and the same message: the bounds of the scope of EU law are strict; 
they should correspond strictly to the competences attributed to the EU. True, from a 
purely formal point of view, only Article 51(2) of the Charter specifically relates 
the scope of application of EU law to Union powers. However, it is submitted 
that Member States when drafting the treaties do not think in terms of scope of 
application. They think in terms of ‘allocation of competences’, and by 
repeatedly limiting the competences allocated to the Union and underlying 
these limits they intend to limit the interference of EU law with the areas of 
‘retained powers’, that is areas which do not pertain to shared or exclusive 
Union’s competences. Notice that even the ‘internal market’ consisting of the 
provisions on free movement is referred to as a field of competence in Article 4 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. As a field of shared 
competence, it too is supposed to have inherent limits. 
 
The Court’s formula reads like a denial of the message enacted by the Member 
States as ‘Masters of the treaties’. Far from containing the scope of EU law, it 
serves as a vehicle for the totalization of the process of integration. It seems that 
there are no longer any reserved domains that are not subject to the 
‘reservation’ that, in exercising their powers, Member States must abide by EU 
law.17 This article will first trace back the roots of the formula in the past case-
law (II). It will then attempt to analyse the argument encapsulated in it (III). 
This will be done by comparing the argument to another more traditional one 
                                            
13 Art. 5 (2) TEU. 
14 Art. 4 (1) TEU. 
15 Art. 48 (2) TEU. 
16 Art. 51 (2) Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
17 This reservation was formulated notably in Micheletti (Case C-369/90, § 10) on state power 
with respect to nationality and reiterated in Case C-135/08, Rottmann [2010] § 47. 
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at work in the case-law of the Court. Finally I will try to discuss the 
distinctiveness of this argument by investigating its possible justifications and 
implications (IV). 
2. From ‘Partial’ to ‘Total Integration’ 
 
It has taken some time before the Court worked out the formula on retained 
powers. From the Steenkolenmijnen case of 1961 to the Schumacker case of 1995, 
there has been a clear yet twisted progression: the formula first developed and 
then petered out into scattered references before re-emerging as a general rule 
of adjudication. Under this formula, the Court now classifies anything that does 
not naturally fall within the EU’s area of intervention. Notice that in the same 
period there has been a shift away from an EC law tending towards the 
complete unification of national markets in certain ‘decisive but limited’ 
sectors, towards a more flexible system of EU law but that extends to those 
sectors supposedly ‘reserved’ for Member States. 
2.1 Partial Integration and Exclusive Authority 
 
The Steenkolenmijnen decision is one of the earliest decisions issued by the 
Court under the European Coal and Steel Community treaty. An association of 
Dutch undertakings had asked the Court to recognize that Germany had 
violated the ECSC Treaty by paying a bonus for mineworkers out of public 
funds.18 This bonus caused an outflow of labour to Germany from neighbouring 
Dutch companies, which saw it as a manifest infringement of the conditions for 
fair and undistorted competition in the common market for coal and steel. 
Under article 4 of the ECSC Treaty, payment of any state aid or subsidy to 
companies to the detriment of competition is prohibited. To enforce this 
prohibition, the Community’s institutions have been granted an exclusive 
power of sanction: 
 
in the Community field, namely in respect of everything that pertains to the 
pursuit of the common objectives within the common market, the 
institutions of the Community have been endowed with exclusive authority.19  
 
                                            
18 Case 30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v. High Authority of the European Coal 
and Steel Community [1961]. 
19 The Court again emphasizes ‘the exclusive character of the Community’s jurisdiction within 
the Community’ further on (ECR. p. 22). 
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However, this authority is only relative. In ‘those sectors of the economy of the 
Member States which do not come within the province of the Community’, the 
Member States continue to exercise ‘residual powers’.20 This is true of ‘their 
social policy’ and ‘over a wide area of their fiscal policy’. This is the result of 
‘the partial nature of the integration effected by the Treaty’. Partial integration 
raises a specific problem, the problem of boundaries: for while there are two 
separate domains, the two exclusive authorities governing them are exercised 
within a single territory and with respect to the same addressees. It may be 
consequently that, in exercising their retained powers over taxation, Member 
States affect the conditions of competition protected by the Community in the 
coal and steel industries.  
  
To this problem, the Court came up with a nuanced response. For one part, it 
ruled that  
 
the jurisdiction of the Community [may] impinge on national sovereignty in 
cases where, because of the power retained by the Member States, this is 
necessary to prevent the effectiveness of the Treaty from being considerably 
weakened and its purpose from being seriously compromised.  
 
The Community should be able to act to effectively pursue the purpose of 
constructing a common market laid down by the Member States in the Treaty.21 
However, only limited prerogatives are conferred thereby. The Court refused to 
extend to these domains the sanction power the Community enjoys within its 
‘own domain’. The Treaty only grants the High Authority in such instances ‘a 
limited power of recommendation’, for ‘remedying’ infringements of competition, 
to try to ‘correct or mitigate’ their effects. This may be insufficient to remove 
these infringements of competition which ‘conflict with the general purpose of the 
Treaty’; but that is ‘the inevitable and legitimate outcome of the partial integration 
which the Treaty seeks to attain’. This is what the Treaty seeks. From the outset, 
the Court experienced European integration in terms of an insuperable 
contradiction. How could one account both for the specialization of spheres, 
the Community sphere and the national sphere, and for the assumption of an 
open-ended and unspecific general purpose such as the ‘existence of the common 
market’? Two options were implicitly rejected by the Court: the idea of strict 
parallel competences and the principle of the absolute superiority of 
                                            
20 Note that the French original version reads ‘pouvoirs retenus’ (retained powers) translated ex-
post in English ‘residual powers’. 
21 Notice how close this line of argument is to the one the Court uses in AETR to justify 
recognition of implicit competences in the Community (Case 22/70 [1971]). For an analysis of 
the argument of implicit competences, see G. Tusseau, Les normes d’habilitation (Dalloz, Paris, 
2006). 
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Community competence. There remained the hypothesis of ‘the necessary 
impingement of the Community competence’.  
 
The Court extended this approach to the domains covered by the European 
Economic Community treaty in the Commission v. French Republic judgment of 
10 December 1969.22 France was accused of maintaining a rate of preferential 
rediscount for French exporters. The French government argued that this 
decision had been taken in a sphere (the monetary sphere) in which the 
Member States were exclusively competent. The Court readily granted this: for 
sure such policy was a form of ‘exercise of their reserved powers’. States had 
jurisdiction to issue, manage, and defend their currencies.23 And yet, in this 
same sphere, there are general rules compelling states to coordinate their 
economic policies and to treat their policies on foreign exchange as a matter of 
‘common concern’ (§14). Being the expression of a fundamental requirement of 
‘solidarity’ within the Community, these rules apply beyond the sphere of 
restrictive powers attributed to Community institutions. That suffices to 
conclude that ‘the exercise of reserved powers cannot therefore permit the unilateral 
adoption of measures prohibited by the Treaty’. While European integration is 
partial insofar as the attributions of Community institutions are limited, it does 
wholly commit the State. The Court suggests the idea of certain ‘total 
obligations’. Membership of the Community implies that governments 
undertake to cooperate in a spirit of loyalty and solidarity, even in policies that 
come within the scope of their retained powers. Now, that means in particular 
complying with the EEC obligation not to grant aid without first being so 
authorized by the Commission. Notice that in this case the exclusive powers of 
the Community are entirely protected and not ‘lightened’ as in the ECSC case. 
Moreover, in the EC/EU law on state aid, the Court has nowadays relinquished 
all references to retained powers. In such cases, it simply states that ‘rules 
relating to tax are not excluded from the scope of Article 87 EC’.24 Even so, the 
theory of the two spheres has not vanished. It remerges, although in another 
form, in the domain of the freedom of movement.   
                                            
22 Joined Cases 6 and 11/69 Commission v. France [1969] 
23 The exclusive competence of States in the monetary sphere was recognized by the Court in a 
series of subsequent judgments: Case 95/81 Commission v. Italy [1982]; Case 57/86 Greece v. 
Commission [1988], Case 127/87 Commission v. Greece [1988]. 
24 Case C-182/03, Belgium and Forum 187 ASBL v. Commission [2006] § 81. 
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2.2 Total integration and the Capacity to be Affected 
 
The Casagrande decision issued in 1974 is not a proper extension of this first 
approach, but it constitutes an interesting step towards totalization, mirroring 
the formula finally reached.25 This case concerned the refusal to award an 
educational grant for the child of an Italian worker who was resident in 
Germany. Article 12 of the EC Regulation on the free movement of workers 
within the Community provides that, in order to promote their integration, the 
children of migrant workers’ families shall be admitted to educational courses 
under the same conditions as the nationals of the host state. Now, the German 
authorities argued that access was one thing, aid another; the latter being part 
of the general education policy and within the exclusive power of Member 
States. To this argument, the Court retorted:  
 
Although educational and training policy is not as such included in the 
spheres which the treaty has entrusted to the Community institutions, it 
does not follow that the exercise of powers transferred to the Community is 
in some way limited if it is of such a nature as to affect the measures taken in 
the execution of a policy such as that of education and training; Chapters 1 
and 2 of Title III of Part Two of the Treaty in particular contain several 
provisions the application of which could affect this policy.26  
 
In this paragraph, the specific provision it is referred to is the rule of non-
discrimination between nationals and migrant worker family members. Non-
discrimination is raised to both an objective of the Community and a basis for 
the exercise of Community competence which is to apply as broadly as possible. 
This justifies the extension of the rule of non-discrimination to a matter 
(measures intended to facilitate educational attendance) considered as closely 
related to the one covered by the EC regulation.  
 
Casagrande is remarkable in that it outlines a distinction that currently governs 
the reasoning of the ECJ: the distinction between the exercise of competence 
and the existence of competence. In their existence, competences may occupy 
separate spheres; but in their exercise, they come together, and the application 
of EU law may ‘affect’ any national policy (§6). The reference to ‘affecting’ 
mirrors the ‘impingement of competence’ stated in the Steenkolenmijnen case. 
                                            
25 Case 9/74, Casagrande [1974]. 
26 For a similar formulation, see Case 65/81, Reina [1982], § 15 (demographic policy); Case 
152/82, Forcheri [1983], § 17 (educational and training policy). 
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However, this formulation is still a long way from the consolidated formula to 
which the Court currently adheres. This formula was cast for the first time in 
1995 in the Schumacker case in reference to direct taxation: ‘Although, as 
Community law stands at present, direct taxation does not as such fall within the 
purview of the Community, the powers retained by the Member States must nevertheless 
be exercised consistently with Community law’.27 Compared with Casagrande, this 
expression works as a chiasma. First, where the Court referred in 1974 to ‘the 
competence of Community institutions’, it now refers to the ‘powers retained 
by the Member States’. Second, the problem is not captured in terms of 
‘powers transferred to the Community’ but in terms of powers exercised by the 
Member States. Thirdly, the Court doesn’t wonder about the ‘effect of the 
Treaty on national policy’ but rather about the ‘effect’ certain national 
measures may have on the sphere governed by the Treaty provisions.28 The 
outcome of this transformation is that the language of ‘competence’ is 
henceforth associated with the Member States, while the language of the ‘rule’ 
is associated with the Union. This is not just wordplay. The focus has changed. 
Instead of focusing on the extension of EU law, the problem becomes one of 
limiting the exercise of competences belonging entirely and legitimately to the 
Member States. The new formula means that in any power unilaterally 
exercised by a Member State, there is not just a capacity to act but also a 
capacity to be affected by EU law.  
 
Inreality, this formulation was elaborated a little earlier in a 1991 judgment, 
Commission v. United Kingdom.29 In this judgment, the Court refers to a line of 
cases dating back to the 1969 judgment.30 Relying on earlier formulations, it 
introduces the expression that ‘powers retained by the Member States must be 
exercised consistently with Community law’. To this it adds the distinction between 
the ‘existence and exercise’ of competence. The full sequence reads:  
 
as Community law stands at present, it is for the Member States to 
determine, in accordance with the general rules of international law, the 
conditions which must be fulfilled in order for a vessel to be registered in 
their registers and granted the right to fly their flag, but, in exercising that 
power, the Member State must comply with the rules of Community law.  
 
                                            
27 Case C-279/93, Schumacker [1995], § 21. 
28 See Case C-120/95, Decker [1998], § 24. 
29 Case C-246/89, Commission v. United Kingdom [1991]. 
30 The Court cites judgments re-iterating the solution and formulation of the 1969 decisions, all 
in the monetary sphere (see note 23).  
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It is not unimportant that this sequence was introduced in answer to an 
argument by the defendant government that the matter at hand (granting of 
nationality to ships) comes within ‘the competence of each State under public 
international law’. The flag flown on the high seas is one of the rare spheres in 
which international law lays down a principle of exclusivity for the state.31 The 
power to determine the conditions for attributing nationality to ships flying its 
flag is a power that belongs to a state and to one state alone. The Court’s 
interpretation consists in deriving from this principle of exclusivity with respect 
to other states a rule as to the distribution of powers between the Member State 
and the EU. As a result, ‘exclusive competence’ is interpreted as meaning that 
the Member State is legitimately in a position to act wherever the EU fails to do 
so.32 The Court responds to the concern of the government to oppose any 
interference from foreign or supranational organs in his ‘reserved’ sphere. But, 
in including this competence in the framework of a division of powers between 
the Member State and the EU, the Court is in the position to recall the Member 
States the obligations they take on under the Treaty. The exclusivity recognized 
by international law is echoed by the obligations derived from Community law, 
which the Court takes it upon itself to protect. 
3. The Argument from Totalization 
 
The retained powers formula was stabilized from the mid 1990s and possibly 
ready to extend the empire of EU law to wholly new sectors. And that would 
probably have been the case, had another more straightforward argument not 
been developed by the Court. The argument from Constitutionalization has 
long barred the way to the argument from Totalization.   
3.1 The ‘Constitutionalization’ of EU Law as a Compelling Argument 
 
In a short paper entitled ‘Fédéralisme et intégration’ published in 1973, P. 
Pescatore pointed out that the argument that had arisen from the 
Steenkolenmijnen decision was already outdated.33 The Van Gend en Loos and 
Costa v. Enel judgments contributing to the ‘constitutionalization of the 
                                            
31 See J. Combacau, ‘Conclusions générales’, in SFDI, Les compétences de l’Etat en droit 
international, (Pedone, Paris, 2006) 315. 
32 On the origin and the different meanings of ‘exclusive competence’ in public international 
law, see J. Basdevant, ‘Règles générales du droit de la paix’, Recueil des cours de l’Académie de 
droit international (1936), t. 58, IV, (Sijthoff, Leiden, 1968), not. Chap. VII. 
33 ‘Fédéralisme et intégration: Remarques liminaires’ (1973), reprod. in Etudes de droit 
communautaire européen 1962-2007 (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2008) 450. 
 VOLUME 4       EJLS   ISSUE 2 
 203 
Community legal order’ had supposedly made this very ‘first approach’ 
obsolete. In recognizing that, by virtue of the Community Treaties, the Member 
States limited ‘their sovereign rights’ and created rights directly for individuals, 
the Court unleashed new potential. It conferred on individuals the capacity to 
go to the national courts to force states to comply with their obligations under 
the Treaty. Arguably, the mechanism of assertion of individual rights has 
superseded questions relating to the delimitation of competences. EC/EU rights 
are functionally broad in scope and not sector-specific. Their application is 
supposedly triggered by any cross-border situation that relates to the 
establishment of the common/internal market. Therefore, the expansion of the 
scope of EU law can easily find a justification in the principle of effectiveness of 
these rights and of their protection. Moreover, state justifications for derogation 
from EU ‘constitutional’ law based on the protection of core national 
competences are banned by the Court. In short, invocation of EU subjective 
rights is largely indifferent to the delineation of competences between the EU 
and its Member States.  
 
A good illustration of this is a judgment which was delivered in the same year 
as Schumacker but is much better known. The Bosman case pertains to 
relations between Community law and professional sport.34 One of the issues it 
raises is whether this sector can escape the hold of the treaty rules on the free 
movement of workers. The Court acknowledges the fact that sport is a special 
domain that cannot be confused with ‘commercial activities’ normally subject 
to the EC Treaty. Accordingly, it points out the ‘considerable social importance of 
sporting activities and in particular football in the Community’ (§106).35 However, 
this specificity cannot, in its view, count as a restriction of the application of the 
Treaty: ‘Having regard to the objectives of the Community, sport is subject to 
Community law in so far as it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of 
Article 2 of the Treaty’.36 To determine whether an activity falls within the ambit 
of the Treaty, it is not therefore any specific character it may have that matters; 
it suffices to establish a relationship between the activity and the 
accomplishment of the objectives of the EC Treaty, in particular the objective 
of establishing the common market.37 The reason for including this activity in 
                                            
34 ECJ, 15 December 1995, Bosman, Case C-415/93. 
35 See also the analogy with the field of culture suggested by the German government (§ 71). 
36 Case 36/74, Walrave [1974] § 4. 
37 Compare the characterization of an economic activity used by the Court in competition law. It 
has been consistently held that ‘any activity consisting in offering goods and services on a given 
market is an economic activity’ (Joined Cases c-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavlov and Others [2000]). See 
L. Idot, ‘Concurrence et libre circulation. Regards sur les derniers développements’ (2005) 3 
Revue des affaires européennes 391-409. 
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the sphere of EU law is that the organization of this activity (’the exercise of 
sports’) may call into question one of the essential objectives of the Community. 
Therefore it may imperil one of the fundamental individual rights conferred by 
the Treaty, that of leaving one’s home country to pursue an economic activity in 
any other Member State. The applicability of Community law is assessed by the 
effects of sports measures on the establishment of the common market. But 
notice it is also by these effects that its application is generally assessed and a 
restriction to trade constituted. It follows, in the reasoning about applicability, 
that the judgment on the restriction to trade has already begun. It is therefore 
only at the stage of justification of a possible derogation that the particular 
features of state regulated activity shall be recognized.  
 
The technique consists therefore in submitting a sphere that does not fall 
within the purview of the EU to the fundamental provisions of the Treaty by 
relying on the teleology included in the Treaty. All the national regulations that 
are liable to impinge on the objectives of economic integration will then come 
within the scope of application of EU ‘constitutional’ law (in particular the 
freedoms of movement). This technique has been used especially in areas in 
which considerations of social cohesion or public morality might seem to 
prevail over strictly market aspects. This has been true in the sphere of 
gambling, characterized by the Court as a field of economic activities but of a 
‘peculiar nature’.38 This has led to an expansionism of EU law whose conditions 
of applicability are substantially broadened, tied sometimes to a form of 
pluralism, insofar as the specific activities may give rise to a special – more 
relaxed – regime of justification.39  
 
Relying on this case-law, one might think that national powers have been 
‘abolished’.40 The problem of the allocation of powers seems to have been 
removed: freedoms of movement are liable to apply to any sphere so long as the 
political project which those freedoms serve – the establishment of the internal 
market – might be affected. How then could one explain the return of the 
retained powers formula in certain judgments at this same period of the history 
of case law? What does the formula bring that could not be settled by the 
invocation of EU rights? Perhaps nothing more than an answer to arguments 
                                            
38 Case C-275/92, Schindler [1994]. On services for emitting and transmitting televised messages, 
see also Case 52/79, Debauve [1980] § 12. 
39 On gambling, see the highly conciliatory judgment, Case C-275/92, Schindler [1994]. After a 
line of more restrictive cases, the Court again loosened its analysis of restriction to trade in 
Case C-42/07, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol [2009]. 
40 Such is indeed the conclusion of Denys Simon, Le système juridique communautaire, 3rd ed. 
(PUF, Paris, 2001) § 89. 
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that were not produced in the Bosman case because of the non-state character 
of the measures at issue in that case. The Duphar decision clearly points in that 
direction. Invited to rule on the provision of medicinal drugs to patients under 
a national social security system, the Court acknowledged for the first time that 
‘Community law does not detract from the powers of Member States to organize their 
social security systems’.41 It added, however, that the regulation, being liable to 
‘affect’ the marketing of medicinal preparations, remained subject to the rules 
on the free movement of goods. At most, it was appropriate to take account of 
the ‘special nature’ of the activity. The solution in Duphar is akin to that in 
Bosman.42 As resumed by Advocate General Fennelly in a later case, the 
application of national social security systems must respect ‘the exercise of the 
rights conferred by Community law’.43 Observance of the retained powers of 
Member States is limited to ‘the inherently uncommercial act of solidarity’ that 
underpins such systems; but when EU objectives are affected, compliance with 
the provisions of the Treaty is mandatory.44  
 
According to this argument, any state regulation that is an obstacle to the 
pursuit of the objectives of economic integration is included within the sphere 
of EU law. Within this sphere, the provisions of EU law implementing the 
Treaty objectives ‘take precedence over any national rule which might conflict with 
them’.45 At first glance, the Schumacker formula does not lead to a different 
outcome. The Member State that retains powers is simply acknowledged in 
these powers but still bound to comply with the rules of the Treaty. The 
express recognition of ‘retained powers’ to Member States does not seem to 
change anything in the structural relationships between EU law and Member 
States. 
 
                                            
41 Case 238/82, Duphar [1984] § 16. 
42 The only difference is that, instead of involving the specific character of the activity in 
question at the justification stage, the Court makes a point of it in characterizing the restriction: 
‘in view of the special nature, in that respect, of the trade in pharmaceutical products, namely 
the fact that social security institutions are substituted for consumers as regards the 
responsibility for the payment of medical expenses, legislation of the type in question cannot in 
itself be regarded as constituting a restriction on the freedom to import guaranteed by article 20 
of the Treaty if certain conditions are satisfied’ (§ 20). A similar solution is reached in Debauve 
(Case 52/79 [1980] § 16) on TV services. These solutions are akin to the technique that was soon 
to be developed by the Court in Keck and Mithouard (Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, Keck 
and Mithouard [1993]). 
43 Opinion of AG Fennelly in Sodemare (Case C-70/95 [1997]), § 28. 
44 See also, on the organization of armed forces, Case C-285/98, Kreil [2000] § 15. 
45 Case 118/75, Watson and Belmann [1976] § 16. 
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3.2 The Development of the Argument from Totalization 
 
The opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in the Kholl and Decker cases points 
in a slightly different direction.46 These are the first cases concerning the 
reimbursement of health care received by a Member State national in another 
Member State. Following the interpretation of Advocate General Fennelly in 
Sodemare, he considers that the case law of the Court with respect to retained 
powers ‘by no means implies that the social security sector constitutes an island beyond 
the reach of Community law’. However, he also suggests there is a need to take 
into account the duty to respect the State’s organizational capacities in the 
sphere of its ‘reserved powers’. According to the Advocate General, two kinds 
of requirements are involved in these cases: on the one hand ‘the survival of 
social security schemes’, which determines social cohesion in all European states, 
and on the other the ‘fundamental principle’ of prohibition of any discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality, the raison d’être of European integration. This is 
the core of the Argument from Totalization. It lies in a form of ‘dramatization’.47  
Whenever a regulatory system pertaining to an ‘area of reserved competence’ is 
challenged before the Court, the question arises: How to safeguard the 
‘essential functions’ of Member States without undermining the ‘core’ of EU 
integration? This indefinite oscillatory motion will repeat in the case law.48 The 
political and social context of distrust towards further integration and 
federalization of Europe may have played a role in the emergence of such a 
change in formulations. 
 
One question remains however: What is to be considered as ‘retained powers’? 
As developed in the case-law, this notion is multipurpose. It covers different 
situations. By this, the Court designates both and indifferently powers which 
are truly exclusively of the State’s competence (conditions for granting 
nationality, system of attribution of surnames),49 spheres in which the EU has 
received competence but only limited powers to act – the road to harmonization 
                                            
46 Opinion of AG Tesauro in Decker (Case C-120/95 [1998]) and Kohll (Case C-158/96 [1998]). 
47 I borrow this term from D. Ritleng, ‘Les Etats membres face aux entraves’ in L. Azoulai (ed), 
L’entrave dans le droit du marché intérieur (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2011). 
48 The Court’s reasoning in Rottmann is an excellent example of this. The Court swings 
incessantly between the legitimacy of state action in the withdrawal of nationality and the need 
to allow for the fundamental status of the person in question as an EU citizen. This is resolved 
by the creation of a double test of proportionality imposed in decision making, one with respect 
to national law; the other with respect to EU law (Case C-135/08, Rottmann [2010] § 55). 
49 Case C-135/08, Rottmann [2010]; Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello [2003]; ECJ, Case C-353/06, 
Grunkin Paul [2008]; Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein [2010]; Case C-391/09, Runevič-Vardyn 
[2011]. 
 VOLUME 4       EJLS   ISSUE 2 
 207 
of national laws being totally or partly prohibited (education, public health, 
social protection, social rights),50 and a domain in which the EU has has 
exercised the powers of harmonization that it possesses only in a piecemeal 
fashion (direct taxation).51 No specific legal criterion accounts for such diversity. 
What brings these subject matters together is rather a certain idea of what the 
State can and should do in Europe. The Court comes close here to what in the 
Treaty is called without being defined the ‘essential State functions’52. These 
are the function of protecting of individuals – by granting nationality, 
attributing surnames, granting social rights; but also the function of integrating 
the members of the society and ensuring social cohesion – via education, 
health, social protection and redistribution. The so-called ‘retained powers’ are 
the collective goods the State is supposed to protect so as to ensure the social 
cohesion of its own population in its territory. That justifies that, in all these 
spheres, the State is vested with a unilateral power to act, excluding the 
intrusion of EU organs. Arguably, by recognizing retained powers, the Court 
recognizes that Member States have a primordial (rather than exclusive) power 
in the organization of a subject area that is considered to be essential to social 
integration. States are no longer reduced to powers potentially destructive for 
the establishment of the common market; they are recognized as autonomous 
                                            
50 On education: Case C-76/05, Schwarz and Gootjes-Schwarz [2007]; Case C-11/06, Morgan 
[2007]; Case C-73/08, Bressol and others [2010].  
The sphere of health is unusual in that, for some specific aspects (safety art. 4(2) TFEU)), it 
involves shared competence between the EU and the Member States, the EU legislator being 
authorized to act uniformly and restrictively, while, for other aspects, any harmonization is 
excluded (art. 168 TFEU): see Case C-372/04, Watts [2006].  
The same is true of social security where certain ‘non essential aspects’ relating to the free 
movement of people may be the subject of joint action (art. 48 TFEU and, currently, art. 21 
TFEU). On social security: Case C-158/96, Kohll [1998]; on welfare benefits: Case C-192/05, Tas-
Hagen [2006]; Case C-499/06; Nerkowska [2008].  
On social rights of workers: Case c-438/05, Viking Line [2007]; Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri 
[2007]. 
51 The legal basis of rare texts adopted on direct taxation lies essentially in art. 115 TFEU, which 
provides for a unanimous vote of the Council ‘in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure’ (Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation 
applicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning 
companies of different Member States; Council Directive 2003/48/EC of 3 June 2003 on taxation 
of savings income in the form of interest payments; Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 
2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made 
between associated companies of different Member States). In this sphere, the judgment 
formulating the principle of framing, followed in a long line of cases, is: Case C-279/93, 
Schumacker [1995]. 
52 Art. 4 (2) TEU. 
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political actors fulfilling their duties as guarantor of the cohesion of the 
European populations.53 
 
It remains to be seen whether that implies a difference of approach in the 
obligations incumbent upon the State. Traditionally, in EC/EU law, a state 
power exercised in economic or commercial matters, while the EU fails to act in 
a uniform manner, is suspect by nature. Not only because, exercised locally on 
the scale of the EU, it brings about compartmentalization; but also because it is 
exercised in conjunction with the other Member States regulating the same 
subject area in their territory and therefore brings about fragmentation. To 
prevent this competition from creating a double regulatory burden for the 
movement of goods and services within the EU, the Court relied on the Treaty 
to delineate powers among Member States. That is the sense of the Cassis de 
Dijon case law.54 By relying on the presumed equivalence of the applicable 
competing national regulations, a single State (generally, the State of origin of 
the good or service) is made responsible for determining whether the 
movement of the good or service is lawful. Can this technique be transposed to 
cases when the Court recognizes the Member State have a so-called ‘retained 
power’? If such were the case, one would have to accept that, say, in the 
sensitive sphere of family law, the principle of the country of origin is to apply 
to cases of marriage between people of the same sex or to surrogate mothers, 
subject only to imperative considerations of public policy.55 That was not the 
path followed until then. In spheres of ‘retained powers’, as in all socially 
sensitive areas, the Court seems inclined to exclude any presumption that 
                                            
53 This may explain the Court’s reluctance to extend this formula to the existence of ‘private 
powers’. In Viking Line, it is indeed private powers that are at issue but, to answer the argument 
that EU law does not apply to the sphere of action of those powers (the exercise of social 
rights), the Court reiterates its formula and its reference to the State, by declaring that ‘even if, 
in the areas which fall outside the scope of the Community’s competence, the Member States 
are still free, in principle, to lay down the conditions governing the existence and exercise of 
the rights in question, the fact remains that, when exercising that competence, the Member 
States must nevertheless comply with Community law’ (Case C-438/05, § 40). 
54 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral (’Cassis de Dijon’) [1979]. See N. Bernard, ‘La libre circulation des 
marchandises, des personnes et des services dans le traité CE sous l’angle de la compétence’ 
(1998) Cahiers de droit européen 11. 
55 See on this point the analysis by K. Lenaerts, ‘Federalism and the Rule of Law: Perspectives 
from the European Court of Justice’ (2010) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1338, 1355 
ff. 
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national regulations are equivalent.56 This accounts in particular for the Grunkin 
Paul judgment on the recognition of surnames.57  
 
In fact, the Argument from Totalization is a twofold argument. One side is the 
applicability of EU law to areas of retained powers. The other side of the coin is 
the recognition of the own essential duties of Member States. Strikingly, the 
language of competences is not limited to the stage of applicability of EU law. 
Soon after the emergence of the formula on ‘retained powers’, the Court 
started recognizing state justifications based on Member States’ competences. 
The recognition of the State’s ‘sovereign powers’ in social protection and public 
health has been reflected in the fact that the maintenance of ‘treatment capacity or 
medical competence on national territory’ may justify a derogation from the 
application of the Treaty.58 Similarly, the retained power in matters of taxation 
has been mirrored in the recognition of the necessary ‘preservation of the 
allocation of the power to impose taxes between Member States’.59 Furthermore, in the 
retained power of the Member State over the regulation of civil status and 
surnames, the Court has seen a form of defence of Member States’ ‘national 
identities’.60 Visibly, in all of these cases, the position of the State is no longer 
reduced to a position of defence of particular interests; it is re-established in its 
essential functions.61 In fact, to understand the sense of the transformation that 
has occurred regarding the system governing the relationships between the 
Member States and EU law, one must reverse the terms of the official formula.62 
The Court includes in its case-law another, implicit, formula, which stands as 
follows: If the areas of competence reserved to the Member States are subject to the 
fundamental principles of EU law, the fact remains that, in applying those principles, 
                                            
56 By way of illustration see the judgment on gambling: Case C-42/07, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol 
[2009] § 69. 
57 Case C-353/06, Grunkin Paul [2008]. What Germany is criticized for in this case is not its 
refusal to apply an equivalent law, the Danish system of attribution of surnames; it is Germany’s 
objecting to the possibility of recognizing a concrete situation that does not correspond to the 
interests defended by its own law. See for a similar analysis in the field of tax law M. Fallon, ‘La 
jurisprudence européenne en matière de double imposition résultant de l’exercice parallèle des 
compétences fiscales: originalité et anomalies’ in V. Deckers e.a. (dir.), Les dialogues de la fiscalité 
- Anno 2010 (Bruxelles, Larcier, 2010) 301. 
58 Case C-372/04, Watts [2006] § 105. 
59 Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer [2005] § 45.  
60 Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein [2010] § 92; Case C-391/09, Runevič-Vardyn [2011] § 86. 
61 See D. Ritleng, ‘Les Etats membres face aux entraves’ in L. Azoulai (ed), L’entrave dans le droit 
du marché intérieur (Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2011). 
62 This has been suggested by Alexandre Maitrot de la Motte in ‘L’entrave fiscale’ L. Azoulai 
(ed.), L’entrave dans le droit du marché intérieur (Bruxelles, Bruylant, forthcoming 2011). 
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the Court must respect and have due regard to the freedom of each Member States in 
exercising its powers.  
 
What does it mean in actual practice? It is perhaps in the Watts case that the 
Court is clearest about the obligation imposed on Member States in domains of 
‘retained powers’.63 When questioned about the compatibility of its case law 
with the ‘exclusive’ responsibility which the Treaty attributes to Member States 
for the organization of health services, that the Court explicitly acknowledges, 
the Court answers that its case-law is not to be construed as  
 
imposing on the Member States an obligation to reimburse the cost of 
hospital treatment in other Member States without reference to any 
budgetary consideration but, on the contrary, are based on the need to 
balance the objective of the free movement of patients against overriding 
national objectives relating to management of the available hospital capacity, 
control of health expenditure and financial balance of social security 
systems. 
 
The search for a right balance may lead States to ‘make adjustments to their 
national systems of social security. It does not follow that this undermines their 
sovereign powers in the field’. In other words, the structure of the national system 
must be reprogrammed so as to allow for the protection and the development 
of individual transnational situations within the EU. That would be the true 
story behind all of this new rhetoric on retained powers: to ‘make adjustments’, 
‘to have regard to all the circumstances of each specific case’.64 In other words, 
to develop solutions based on equity – or call it transnational equity to make 
sense of the protection of interests lacking representation under purely national 
regulatory systems.  
 
One may wonder, however, whether this distinction between the free choice of 
a system of regulation, which is to be safeguarded, and the implementation of 
that system in specific instances, which has to be adjusted and equitable, is a 
serious and sustainable one.65 That would mean in practice that the national 
authority, without changing the national system, must be ready at any time to 
correct the application of the rule in the light of the ‘personal circumstances’ 
                                            
63 Case C-372/04, Watts [2006]. 
64 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits et Peerbrooms [2001] § 104. 
65 For the distinction, see Opinion of AG Sharpston in Grunkin Paul (Case C-353/06 [2008]), § 
49. See also § 34 of the judgement; Case C-73/08, Bressol and others [2010] § 29. For a tough 
critique of this distinction, see G. Davies, ‘The Price of Letting Courts Value Solidarity: The 
Judicial Role in Liberalizing Welfare’ in M. Ross & Y. Borgmann-PRebil (eds), Promoting 
Solidarity in the European Union (OUP, Oxford 2010). 
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characterizing the case of the EU citizen in question.66 That may seem very 
little. But, in reality, this apparently minor requirement is overarching. Even 
outside the scope of attributions of the Union, Member States are exposed to 
the encroachment of EU law that they cannot withstand other than by adapting 
their law. 
4. The Distinctiveness of the Total Law Doctrine 
 
The development of the Argument from Totalization of EU law is not only 
grounded on a strategy of expansion. It is based on a specific vision of the 
position and the posture of the State as member of the European Union. It 
amounts to the emergence of a real doctrine. However, the question remains as 
to how to justify such ‘jurisdiction of the Community to impinge on national 
sovereignty’ as the Court put it in its early case of 1961. To make these 
justifications clear will help us to pinpoint the possible implications of this 
case-law. 
4.1 Justifications 
 
To justify such an impingement, the Court first resorted to the ideas of 
necessity and purpose. The ‘effectiveness of the Treaty’ would be greatly 
diminished and its ‘purpose’ would be seriously compromised if the 
Community were not allowed to act beyond the narrow sphere of the exclusive 
competences that were attributed to it.67 In other words, if States could freely 
use their powers in the sphere of their retained powers, one could fear a 
fragmentation of the integration project, both materially and geographically. 
For want of any uniformity and universality in the application of rules on the 
freedom of circulation, the very project of establishing a single European 
market would be endangered: 
 
The internal market would not have the comprehensive aim of providing an 
area without internal frontiers (Article 14(2) EC), but would be merely 
fragmentary as it would be limited to individual products and activities 
governed by specific rules of Community law.68  
 
                                            
66 See for example Case C-372/04, Watts [2006]; Case C-499/06; Nerkowska [2008].  
67 Case 30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v. High Authority [1961] ECR p. 46. 
68 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Tas-Hagen and Tas (Case C-192/05 [2006]), § 35. 
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In this justification, the only question is one of the effectiveness of the 
integration project. The meaning of the project is unstated. A purely 
instrumental justification would not be of much worth if it did not pursue 
further. 
 
In Commission v. France 1969, as seen, the Court did indeed go further. It 
founded the impingement on ‘the common concern of Member States’, ‘[t]he 
solidarity, which is at the basis of these obligations as of the whole of the community 
system’. The solidarity requirement reveals the existence of a commitment in 
favour of the creation of a Community that goes beyond the collection of States 
that make it up. The idea is that the Union has its own structure, separate from 
a simple collection of States. Being based on a ‘transfer of sovereign rights’ it is 
akin to a political authority and implies for its members extended obligations of 
cooperation and solidarity.69 Thereby, the encroachment of fundamental EU 
law is structurally justified. Notice that a similar structural argument is to be 
found in the case law of the US Supreme Court.70 To justify the application and 
superiority of federal law, the Court refers to the ‘coherent whole’ that the 
federation constitutes.71 The power specific to each Member State is not denied. 
However, that power exists only with respect to a ‘global system’ in which it is 
bound up.72 In the same vein, P. Pescatore stated that if the national authorities 
– and first among them the constitutional courts – must yield to the force of 
Community law, although they are supposed to preserve the powers reserved to 
the State, it is because ‘each only controls a fragment of the total territory of the 
Community’.73 Acting only for a part of the EU’s citizens, national sovereigns 
potentially endanger the common interest of the Member States and of their 
citizens. Hence the necessity to yield to the power exercised by the Union. 
Union power is the realization of an ‘idée d’oeuvre commune’ that is supposedly 
                                            
69 The first systematic description of this structure is in P. Pescatore, The Law of Integration. 
Emergence of a new phenomonon in international relations, based on the experience of the European 
Communities (Sijthoof, Leiden, 1974). 
70 In the famous case of McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316 (1819), Justice Marshall writes in 
relation to the conflict of jurisdiction between the federal state and the federated state: ‘The 
difference is that which always exists, and always must exist, between the action of the whole on 
a part, and the action of a part on the whole — between the laws of a Government declared to 
be supreme, and those of a Government which, when in opposition to those laws, is not 
supreme’.  
71 O. Beaud, Théorie de la Fédération (PUF, Paris, 2007) 191-2. 
72 See in that connection K. Boskovits, Le juge communautaire et l’articulation des compétences 
normatives entre la Communauté européenne et ses Etats membres, (Sakkoulas/Bruylant, 
Athens/Brussels, 1999) 218. 
73 P. Pescatore, ‘La protection des droits ordinaires du ‘Citoyen Européen’’ (2006), reprod. in 
Etudes de droit communautaire européen 1962-2007 (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2008) 935. 
 VOLUME 4       EJLS   ISSUE 2 
 213 
manifest in the Treaties.74 This way the power retained by each State and its 
participation in a greater common whole can both be asserted together.  
 
The third justification is the most elaborate. It is ethical in nature. It consists in 
contemplating the integration process not only as a project for economic unity 
or as a form of political solidarity but as an ethos: that is the occupation of a 
space – the European space, and the protection of individual situations within 
that space. The encroachment of EU law into areas of retained powers is 
justified by the need to impose the consideration of isolated interests in the 
Union, interests of those who circulate within the Union, who come from or are 
established in other Member States. Those interests that are naturally under-
represented in the legislation of Member States constitute the ‘European’ 
situations par excellence.75 In that context, the provisions on freedom of 
movement and non-discrimination operate as rules of conduct imposed on 
Member States. EU law forces the State authorities to rethink the way they act. 
The following passage in the Rottmann decision illustrates this point perfectly: 
‘the fact that a matter falls within the competence of the Member States does 
not alter the fact that, in situations covered by European Union law, the national 
rules concerned must have due regard to the latter’.76 Such situations are 
characterized through connecting factors elaborated on a factual basis. 
Connection to fundamental EU law generally relies on an element of 
transnationality in the situation at issue, but sometimes it extends more broadly 
to forms of plurinationality77 and ‘Europeanity’.78 Such connection triggers a 
restructuration. The Court asks the State to reorganize its normative 
programmes so as to avoid the exclusion of ‘European’ situations and interests 
from the modes of apprehension of national law. Moreover, to compel the State 
to take account of these interests, the Court has developed an obligation to 
cooperate with the authorities of other Member States79 and an obligation to 
                                            
74 P. Pescatore (n 69) 41. 
75 This has been thematized by C. Joerges & J. Neyer, ‘“Deliberative Supranationalism” 
Revisited’, EUI Working Paper Law, 2006/20. See also C. Joerges, ‘Sur la légitimité 
d’européaniser le droit privé. Plaidoyer pour une approche procédurale’ (2004) Revue 
Internationale de Droit Economique 133. 
76 Case C-135/08, Rottmann [2010] § 41. Emphasis added 
77 Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello [2003]. 
78 In some case, connection may occur regardless of any form of extraneity because the very 
status of EU citizen is called into question: Case C-135/08, Rottmann [2010], Case C-135/08; Case 
C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano [2011]. 
79 See, for example, Case C-279/93, Schumacker [1995] § 45. 
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take into consideration all the items of the situation involved.80 These 
guarantees are designed to ensure the decision-making process at national level 
is more reflexive. 
4.2 Implications 
 
There seems to be nothing original in these three justifications. They may be 
used to justify authority of EU law in many other instances, irrespective of the 
nature of state powers. Should it be concluded that it is simply a rhetorical 
formula? To finally answer this question, let us consider the basic categories 
forged by legal scholarship in conceptualizing European law. The development 
of the EC/EU legal order is traditionally ordered around two fundamental 
themes. The first is the ‘refashioning of sovereignties’, that Pierre Pescatore 
first highlighted in his book on ‘The law of integration’. It consists in ‘a 
redistribution of functions’, that is, in developing the competence and 
normative powers of the Union, which exercises them autonomously, uniformly 
and bindingly. At the same time, Member States are to be prevented from 
infringing the action undertaken by the Union’s organs. To this effect, the 
Court has developed what is termed a ‘doctrine of pre-emption’.81 The second 
theme was brought out by Joseph Weiler. It is called ‘constitutionalization of 
EU law’ because it consists in deriving from the provisions of the Treaty 
general and substantive obligations, ‘constitutional rules’ that Member States 
are bound to abide by in all spheres in which they exercise their powers.82 This 
development is complementary to the first one. It generates subjective rights 
that can be invoked in national courts even in cases where the Union is unable 
to act through the powers attributed to it. Those are the two aspects, one 
structural, the other normative, of European legal integration. Both were 
shaped by the Court’s case law in the first fifty years of integration. 
 
The doctrine on retained powers roughly recalls the doctrine of pre-emption 
first forged by the US Supreme Court. Among the various forms this judicial 
doctrine took on, one has been called ‘obstacle preemption’ or ‘conflict 
                                            
80 See, for example, Case C-372/04, Watts [2006] § 116. 
81 On preemption in EU law see recently R. Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism. The 
Changing Structure of European Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009); and see K. 
Boskovits, Le juge communautaire et l’articulation des compétences normatives entre la Communauté 
européenne et ses Etats membres (Sakkoulas/Bruylant, Athens/Brussels, 1999) 287 ff. 
82 On the constitutionalization of EU law, see J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe. ‘Do the 
New Clothes Have an Emperor?’ And Other Essays on European Integration (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1999), 19 ff. 
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preemption’.83 This consists in considering that the legislation of a federated 
state will be pre-empted and consequently set aside should it be an obstacle to 
the full and complete achievement of the goals and objectives of the Congress 
legislation.84 As a result, the spheres of competence traditionally reserved to 
federated States, like health or safety, may be subjected to the authority of the 
federal state.85 This doctrine has made it possible to circumvent the obstacle of 
the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution whereby ‘[t]he powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to 
the States respectively, or to the people’. At this point, the analogy with EU law is 
striking. However, there is a fundamental point on which the doctrines of the 
two Courts diverge: the US doctrine of pre-emption applies exclusively to 
federal acts. It is the intention or the purpose of the US Congress that is to be 
implemented. It aims at protecting the exercise of a federal legislative 
competence. By contrast, the Court’s doctrine on retained powers concerns the 
application of EU primary law, namely the provisions on the freedom of 
movement related to internal market and EU citizenship. Its purpose is not to 
protect the legislative powers exercised by the Union. The Court relies on 
Treaty provisions precisely because it does not want to replace the powers of 
the Member States by those of the Union. EU Total law is not a matter of pre-
empting the sphere occupied by national regulations but of adapting the way in 
which they are applied.  
 
The doctrine on retained powers is perhaps better compared to the old 
doctrine of limits developed by the Court in criminal matters. In both cases, the 
aim is to create EU obligations so as to limit the exercise of national powers. 
The Court has since long recognized that  
 
criminal legislation and the rules of criminal procedure are matters for which the 
Member States are responsible’ and not the Union.86 And yet, ‘it is clear from a 
consistent line of cases decided by the Court, that Community law also sets certain 
                                            
83 For a full analysis of the doctrine of preemption, L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Vol I, 
Foundation Press, New York, 2000) 1200 ff. 
84 ‘If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still 
preempted… where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress’ (US Supreme Court, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 464 US (1984). See 
Pacific Gas & Electric co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation a Development Comm’n 461 
US 190 (1983). 
85 On civil and social matters, see for example US Supreme Court, Sandra Jean Dale Boggs, 
Petitionner v. Thomas F. Boggs, Harry M. Boggs and David B. Boggs, n° 96-79 (1997). 
86 Most recently, Case C-6/11 PPU, El Dridi [2011] § 53. 
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limits in that area as regards the control measures which it permits the Member 
States to maintain.87  
 
It follows that criminal law may be ‘affected’.88 Notice however that this 
concerns mainly criminal sanctions as obstacles to free movement. Measures 
affected are measures of supervision or sanction that are adjunctive to 
legislations of economic or commercial nature. In fact, the criminal character of 
the regulation so affected matters less than its instrumental character.89 It is first 
the policy instrument that is affected here. The doctrine on retained powers is 
much broader in scope. Beyond the State as regulator/sanction-taker, it is the 
deepest structures of the welfare state and of the nation state – taxation, social 
protection, conditions of persons – that are affected.  
 
It may seem more judicious, then, to compare the doctrine with the ‘absorption 
doctrine’ described by Joseph Weiler in his outstanding study of the 
constitutionalization of EU law.90 The Court has extended the reach of EU law 
to spheres of national law that lie outside the EU’s area of competence. The 
finest example of this is perhaps Casagrande. In this judgment, as has been 
seen, the Court extends the rule of non-discrimination enshrined in EC 
regulation to a subject matter not covered by that regulation. Recent case law 
provides fresh examples of such extension. However, instead of referring to 
‘Community competences’, the Court prefers to refer to the general principles 
of EU law.91 The argument then consists in seeing in a legislative provision the 
‘materialization’ of a higher and more general principle, which then leads to the 
applicability of the said provision beyond the scope provided for by the 
legislation. Thereby EU law is applied to situations that lie outside the purview 
of the European legislator.92 Consider by way of illustration the Impact 
judgment on the application of the framework agreement on fixed-term 
employment. The Court referred to the distinction existence/exercise of 
competence to state:  
 
                                            
87 Case 203/80, Casati [1981] § 27; Case C-387/93, Banchero [1995] § 58. See also Case C-348/96, 
Calfa [1999] § 17; Case C-338/04, Placanica [2007] § 68. 
88 Case C-226/97, Lemmens [1998] § 19. 
89 Compare on customs matters, Case C-546/09, Aurubis Balgaria [2011] § 41. 
90 The term ‘absorption’ is used by J. Weiler in his commentary on Casagrande, (n 82) 47. 
91 See, for example, Case C-307/05, Del Cerro Alonso [2007]; Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci [2010].  
92 See the criticism of this practice in Editorial Comments, ‘The scope of application of the 
general principles of Union law: An ever expanding Union?’ (2010) CML Rev. 1589. 
 VOLUME 4       EJLS   ISSUE 2 
 217 
while it is true […] that the establishment of the level of the various 
constituent parts of the pay of a work falls outside the competence of the 
Community legislature and is unquestionably still a matter for the competent 
bodies in the various Members States, those bodies must nevertheless 
exercise their competence consistently with Community law […] in the areas 
in which the Community does not have competence.93  
 
As a result, the non-discrimination clause inserted in the framework agreement 
shall have to be extended to the state policy relating to pay.  
 
In view of this development, it may be tempting to reduce the totalization 
doctrine to the traditional absorption doctrine. However, this temptation 
should be resisted. Totalization is not absorption. In cases like Casagrande and 
Impact, the legislative competence of the Union is extended to sensitive national 
areas.94 Under the application of the doctrine on retained powers, on the 
contrary, the Court protects ‘reserved areas’ regulated by Member States. 
Instead of suggesting an extension of Union competence, it acknowledges that 
full integration has not been and cannot be completed. There are areas which 
remain outside the Union jurisdiction. In these domains, the Court imparts to 
specific Treaty provisions a function of ‘responsibilization’ of national 
authorities. National authorities are vested with thinking if not acting 
‘European’ to the full extent of the State’s capacity.95 In so doing, the Court 
relies mainly on the provisions on free movement. They are general and flexible 
enough to allow for refashioning national decision-making processes.96 The 
obligations imposed on Member States are essentially reflexive in nature. They 
consist in requiring the States to use their power in a ‘reasonable’ way, in 
consideration of the singular case to which it applies and within the wider 
transnational framework in which it is exercised. The aim is to ask States to 
                                            
93 Case C-268/06, Impact [2008] § 129.  
94 On this recent development of case law, see K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The 
Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU Law’ (2010) CMLR 1629; S. 
Prechal, ‘Competence Creep and General Principles of Law’ (2010) 3 (1) Review of European 
Administrative Law 5. 
95 In analysing this case law, K. Lenaerts similarly invokes the obligation on States to ‘think 
federal’ (‘Federalism and the rule of law: Perspectives from the European Court of Justice’ 
(2010) 33 Fordham International Law Journal 1340). 
96 In Rottmann, AG Poiares Maduro considers however that ‘it would […] be wrong to assume 
that […] only certain Community rules – essentially the general principles of law and the 
fundamental rights – are capable of being invoked against the exercise of State competence in 
this sphere. In theory, any rule of the Community legal order may be invoked if the conditions 
for the acquisition and loss of nationality laid down by a Member State are incompatible with it’ 
(§ 28 of opinion). So analysed, however, the doctrine becomes a mere expression of the 
doctrine of primacy of EU law. 
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adapt their systems and procedures so as to open them up to the interests 
protected by the EU. What is required is a reorganization of the internal forum 
rather than a colonization of the State by EU rules and powers.  
 
This may be true in theory but does it apply in practice? The dividing line may 
be hard to draw indeed. B. de Witte has recently convincingly argued that there 
has since long existed a competence for the EU ‘to pursue a large number of 
non-market aims by means of internal market legislation’.97 This competence is 
subject to limits, in particular to ‘the requirement that the measure must also 
adequately contribute to improve the conditions for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market’. However, in actual practice, these limits 
proved to be relatively easy to satisfy.98 Now, the doctrine of totalization 
apparently stands as an ideal ground for developing further the ‘EU 
competence to protect’. The adoption of the directive on cross-border health 
care is an excellent example that this judicial doctrine can be readily exploited 
by EU institutions to justify new forms of legislative intervention.99  
5. Integration Through Law and Equity 
 
This article aimed at analysing a recurrent formula present in the case-law of 
the European Court of Justice. Many of the same facets of the relevant 
jurisprudence have already been explored in various strands of literature. These 
focus on EU citizenship and its impact on fields such as health, education and 
social security or on the ‘constitutional asymmetry’ which results from having 
weak EU legislative powers and strong primary Treaty provisions and the effect 
of this situation on the balance between economic and social rights under EU 
law are relevant in that connection. However, none of those studies have 
addressed specifically the common source of all these developments, namely 
the ‘odd’ formula on retained powers. Such formula may come as a surprise 
when contemplating the long evolution of EC/EU law. Under the 
‘constitutionalization trend’ forged by the Court, EU law was deemed to 
encompass any situation relating to the establishment of the internal market, 
irrespective of the subject matter involved. Why then introduce this reference 
to the ‘retained powers’ of the Member States in the mid of the 1990s’ and, 
                                            
97 B. de Witte, ‘A Competence to Protect: The Pursuit of Non-Market Aims through Internal 
Market Legislation’ in P. Syrpis (ed), The Judiciary, the Legislature and the EU Internal Market 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
98 See e.g. Case C-58/08, Vodafone [2010]. 
99 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the 
application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare, OJ 2011 L 88, p. 45. 
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since then, constantly resort to it while it may appear as an obstacle to the full 
application of EU law?  
 
It has been argued that the formula has been used by the Court as a twofold 
argument. First as a way of recognizing the essential own capacities of the 
Member States within the integrated European space. Second as a matter of 
including certain under-protected interests and situations in the manner the 
national authorities usually use to think and to act. However, this refashioning 
of state authorities’ reactions and behaviours should not be done arbitrarily. 
Otherwise, it would run the risk of being felt as over-intrusive. Much remains 
to be worked out as regards the specification of the concrete situations worthy 
of protection based on EU law. Closer scrutiny of this doctrine and of its 
implementation would be fruitful not only to de-fuse criticism elicited by the 
EU’s supposed ‘creeping competence’ but also, more positively, to reconstruct 
the meaning of the process of integration through law and through equity. 
 
 
 
